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SYMPOSIUM 
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND THE BRAIN:  WHEN 
LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE COLLIDE 
FOREWORD 
Deborah W. Denno* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Foreword provides an overview of Criminal Behavior and the Brain:  
When Law and Neuroscience Collide, a symposium hosted by the Fordham 
Law Review and cosponsored by the Fordham Law School Neuroscience and 
Law Center.  While the field of neuroscience is vast—generally constituting 
“the branch of the life sciences that studies the brain and nervous system”1—
this symposium focused on the cutting-edge ties between neuroscience 
evidence and the different facets of criminal law.  Such an intersection invited 
commentary from an expert group on a wide span of topics, ranging from the 
historical underpinnings between law and neuroscience to the treatment of 
young adults to the different roles of neuroscience in the context of 
sentencing, expert testimony, defenses, prediction, punishment, and 
rehabilitation, as well as the civil and criminal divide.  These diverse subjects 
have an overarching theme in common:  each pertains in some way to the 
criminal justice system’s effort to punish or rehabilitate more fairly and 
effectively. 
 
*  Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law, Founding Director, Neuroscience and Law Center, 
Fordham University School of Law.  This Foreword reviews the Fordham Law Review 
symposium entitled Criminal Behavior and the Brain:  When Law and Neuroscience Collide 
(cosponsored with the Fordham Law School Neuroscience and Law Center) held at Fordham 
Law School.  I am most grateful to the symposium participants for their insightful 
interdisciplinary presentations as well as their articles published in this issue.  I also thank the 
members of the Fordham Law Review for their incredible care and thought in organizing the 
symposium and the editorial process.  Marianna Gebhardt and Erica Valencia-Graham 
provided excellent comments and assistance for this Foreword.  I am indebted to Fordham 
Law School and the Gerald Edelman Fellowship for funding. 
 
 1. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW:  BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE glossary at 
206 (Brent Garland ed., 2004); see also OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 762 
(2014) (defining neuroscience as “[t]he scientific study of the structure and function of the 
nervous system; includes experimental and clinical studies of animals and humans”). 
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I.  NEUROSCIENCE AND LAW:  
HISTORY AND FRAMEWORK 
Any informed discussion of criminal behavior and the brain must start with 
a historical overview of the use of neuroscience in the courtroom.  Francis 
Shen’s article focuses on developments in this area that have occurred over 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.2  Shen contends that current studies 
of neuroscience and law should incorporate greater awareness of this history 
given the ways in which the past may illuminate the present.3  While brain 
science can improve the law, there always have been limits to how much 
science can resolve legal problems.4 
Shen examines four sequential and overlooked “moments”5 in history:  (1) 
the communications between medicine and law in the nineteenth century and 
the early twentieth century, (2) the start of the legal system’s use of 
electroencephalography evidence in the mid-twentieth century, (3) the 
application of psychosurgery as a means of averting an individual’s violent 
behavior during the 1960s and 1970s, and (4) the developing use of 
neuroscience in personal injury cases in the late 1980s and throughout the 
1990s.6  Although the science during these moments has not always been 
successful in achieving its goals, much has been written on issues such as 
eugenics, phrenology, the frontal lobotomy, and what the past use of these 
techniques might predict for today.7 
The law’s engagement with the lobotomy in the 1940s and 1950s is 
perhaps the most concerning development in this area.8  Shen examines the 
most troubling aspects of this practice, both in modern times and decades 
ago,9 particularly in the context of racial unrest and urban riots.10  Yet, he 
acknowledges that “[p]sychosurgery made national headlines but never made 
much headway in the actual criminal justice system.”11 
The surge of forensic neuropsychology in civil litigation in the 1990s had 
a different outcome, however.  It provided a foundation for current advances 
in the intersection between neuroscience and law12 as awareness grew of the 
increasing number of neuropsychologists testifying in court cases.13  Shen 
concludes by explaining that, while the history of neuroscience and law is 
generally problematic, underexplored, and incautious,14 “we are in the 
 
 2. Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked History of Neurolaw, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 667 
(2016). 
 3. Id. at 667–68. 
 4. Id. at 668. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 680–81. 
 8. Id. at 681. 
 9. Id. at 682–83. 
 10. Id. at 683–84. 
 11. Id. at 684. 
 12. Id. at 685. 
 13. Id. at 685–86. 
 14. Id. at 691–92. 
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middle of a revolution in neuroscience”15 that brings with it ever-increasing 
growth and interest in brain research.16  Shen’s article is a call to action, 
inviting readers to “learn from our past mistakes, build on our past successes, 
and forge a future of increasingly productive interdisciplinary 
conversation.”17 
Elizabeth Bennett’s article also provides some historical perspective but 
centers on more recent developments, from the 1980s to the present, 
primarily within the retributivist versus consequentialist context.18  While 
Shen focuses on the evolution of neuroscience prior to and during the initial 
stages of its use in courtrooms, Bennett is concerned more with developing 
theories that underlie the link between law and neuroscience and how 
neuroscience is currently employed in courtrooms (to mitigate sentencing).19 
Bennett begins by assuming that “[m]oral responsibility is the foundation 
of criminal law,”20 and she raises the question of whether advances in 
neuroscience and brain imaging will weaken or even dissolve that 
foundation.21  To probe this issue, Bennett first describes the history and 
evolution of criminal law over time,22 noting that, although the criminal law 
varies in different societies and cultures, each system shares two key 
principles:  (1) defendants must have some level of intent to be culpable for 
a criminal act and (2) the punishment the state provides will be proportional 
to that level of intent.23  Bennett posits that neuroscience will help to ensure 
these two principles are enacted in a way that is more accurate and fair.24  She 
claims that “[a] fair sentencing regime” requires both retributivist and 
consequentialist principles.25 
So far, prosecutors have not used neuroscience evidence to predict a 
defendant’s future violent behavior or recidivism nor to argue for longer 
sentences and preventive detention.26  Yet it remains to be seen whether 
prosecutorial practices will change as neuroscience evidence becomes more 
accepted.27  Likewise, many researchers in the fields of neuroscience and law 
anticipate that neuroscience will take a more significant role in identifying 
and explaining brain disorders that show a greater link to a defendant’s 
criminal conduct and mental state, including substance abuse addiction and 
defenses such as insanity.28 
 
 15. Id. at 692 (quoting Henry T. Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience:  An 
Early Look at the Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687, 688 (2009)). 
 16. Id. at 693. 
 17. Id. at 695. 
 18. Elizabeth Bennett, Neuroscience and Criminal Law:  Have We Been Getting It Wrong 
for Centuries and Where Do We Go from Here?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (2016). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 437. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 437–39. 
 23. Id. at 439–40. 
 24. Id. at 440. 
 25. Id. at 444. 
 26. Id. at 449. 
 27. Id. at 450. 
 28. Id. 
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Given these and numerous other potential uses for neuroscience in the 
criminal justice system, Bennett lists ways in which the criminal justice 
system could change.29  For example, developments in neuroscience could 
expand or increase the number of excuses, including the ability to better 
identify those who should receive insanity verdicts.30  In light of these and 
other possibilities, Bennett concludes by highlighting the enormous impact 
that neuroscience may have on the criminal justice system:  if neuroscience 
“does eventually provide significant insights into the mind, it may well be 
necessary to revamp our thinking on the Anglo-American system of criminal 
justice and perhaps our approach to the law entirely.”31 
II.  NEUROSCIENCE AND SENTENCING POLICY 
The potential role for neuroscience in law is perhaps most frequently 
discussed in the context of sentencing.  Like Bennett, Nancy Gertner 
examines how neuroscience offers the possibility of yet another shift in 
American sentencing by aiding the development of a more informed 
sentencing approach.32  She begins with an overview of the history of 
sentencing and how changes throughout that history (such as the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984) have altered judges’ approaches.33  Gertner writes from 
a highly personal perspective, given her seventeen-year federal judicial 
career; she explains that she is currently “reviewing the sentences [she] was 
obliged to give to hundreds of men—mostly African American men”—
during the course of her years on the bench.34  Her initial conclusion is 
striking:  “I believe that 80 percent of the sentences that I imposed were 
unfair, unjust, and disproportionate.”35  All the factors that she and 
neuroscientists have discovered to impact behavior were “irrelevant to the 
analysis [she] was supposed to conduct.”36 
With that bold start, Gertner views the topic of neuroscience and 
sentencing from three perspectives:  (1) the “sentencer’s brain” and all that 
the sentencer experiences, (2) the “sentencing stage” and the kinds of rules 
that control it, and (3) the “substantive content” that neuroscience can 
contribute to sentencing.37  She explains that, for the past thirty years, the 
sentencer’s brain has concentrated exclusively on retribution and sentencing 
disparity between judges, thereby buffering a “rigid, formulaic, and severe” 
sentencing scheme.38  The past decade’s growing recognition of problems 
associated with mass incarceration, racial inequities, and high prison costs 
have prompted the concept of a “new rehabilitation” guided by 
 
 29. Id. at 450–51. 
 30. Id. at 451. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Nancy Gertner, Neuroscience and Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 533 (2016). 
 33. Id. at 534–41. 
 34. Id. at 533. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 533–34. 
 38. Id. at 534. 
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neuroscience.39  Gertner emphasizes, however, that this “new rehabilitation” 
must avoid the problems of the past. 
Gertner provides a detailed critique of the Sentencing Reform Act and the 
new agency it started, the U.S. Sentencing Commission.40  Because the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission lacked sentencing experts and produced 
unsophisticated research, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the 
Guidelines”) were ill informed and devoid of purpose.41  Indeed recent 
neuroscience research has shown the negative effects the Guidelines have 
imposed on judicial decision making and the unfairness it creates in 
sentencing.42  According to Gertner, the goal is to devise a system that 
enables judicial discretion and judgment while also bypassing the hazards of 
the pre-Guidelines flaws.43  “This would be a system informed by appellate 
review, and even peer review, with evidence-based guidance from 
neuroscience, social psychology, and psychiatry—not mandatory diktats.”44  
Such a system would also address the problems that accompany expert 
sentencing at trial and the need to strengthen procedural protections in 
noncapital cases.45 
The “new rehabilitation” therefore provides opportunities for the criminal 
justice system to shun retribution in lieu of a regime more neuroscientifically 
suitable to defendants’ individual needs.46  In addition, neuroscience findings 
can shed light on a range of other troubling challenges that impact offenders, 
including inadequate prison conditions, solitary confinement, prison 
violence, and issues pertaining to juveniles.47  While neuroscience research 
also can help assess which programs succeed or fail,48 Gertner warns that 
there are drawbacks to relying on neuroscience evidence.49 
Gertner ends by emphasizing the special role that neuroscience plays in 
sentencing determinations.50  Instead of using neuroscience evidence to 
assess defendants’ culpability or whether they should be executed, “ordinary 
sentencing” should be “forward looking, considering recidivism, deterrence, 
and rehabilitation.”51  In focusing on defendants’ futures, the criminal justice 
system “should use all of the new tools at [our] disposal, so long as [we] 
understand[] the history and risks.”52 
Bernice B. Donald and Erica Bakies consider more specifically how 
neuroscience has been incorporated during the sentencing process, as well as 
 
 39. Id. at 535. 
 40. Id. at 536–37. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 538. 
 43. Id. at 541. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 544. 
 47. Id. at 544–45. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 545. 
 50. Id. at 546. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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the tools that courts evaluate, such as neuroimaging.53  Their article also 
discusses how neuroscience can help judges overcome their implicit biases.54  
Like the Gertner article, Donald and Bakies’s article provides a thorough 
background on the current and perhaps future role of neuroscience in judicial 
decision making.55 
The authors begin by asking how neuroscience evidence could be 
effectively applied in the context of sentencing.56  Their answer provides the 
article’s theme that neuroscience can be used to show how certain actions 
may result from developmental problems associated with the brain, like the 
effects of complex trauma on children.57  The authors’ approach is consistent 
with current trends and efforts in neuroscience, including President Barack 
Obama’s launch of the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative 
Neurotechnologies Initiative.58  As a consequence, fields of study concerning 
the brain (such as neuropsychology) have grown substantially59 and have 
enhanced the perspective and evidence that neuroscience provides.60  This 
expanded multidisciplinary view can include measures ranging from brain 
scans to social and family histories61 as well as neuroscience research 
demonstrating how childhood trauma can impact brain development and 
behavior.62 
In order to provide perspective on these issues, the authors examine the 
history of sentencing in the United States from the seventeenth century 
through the 1980s, when sentencing centered on deterrence and 
incapacitation in light of the War on Drugs.63  While judges initially 
possessed nearly unlimited sentencing discretion,64 this lack of oversight 
changed in 1984 when Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, which 
established the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.65  Donald and Bakies note that, although the Guidelines are no 
longer mandatory, they continue to have a negative effect on those who are 
mentally ill.66 
The authors also examine how neuroscience is currently incorporated 
within the criminal justice system, noting that it has been introduced in all 
three phases of a criminal trial:  competency determinations, the guilt phase, 
 
 53. Bernice B. Donald & Erica Bakies, A Glimpse Inside the Brain’s Black Box:  
Understanding the Role of Neuroscience in Criminal Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 481 
(2016). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. at 481. 
 57. Id. at 481–82. 
 58. Id. at 482–83. 
 59. Id. at 483. 
 60. Id. at 483–87. 
 61. Id. at 484. 
 62. Id. at 485–87. 
 63. Id. at 488–92. 
 64. Id. at 489. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 490. 
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and the sentencing phase.67  In civil cases, claims using neuroscience have 
covered a wide range of areas including personal injury, medical malpractice, 
and toxic exposure68—associations that can also be relevant in the criminal 
context.  While most jurisdictions accept a neuropsychologist’s testimony 
concerning the link between an existing brain injury and causation, a minority 
of states exclude it on the basis that only medical experts are qualified to 
testify on the relevant diagnostic and causal issues.69  Still, neuroscience 
evidence is readily admitted into courtrooms and it plays a substantial role in 
mitigating factors applicable to the death penalty.70  Indeed, cognitive 
scientists are now assisting defendants’ mitigation arguments “‘by invoking 
cutting-edge brain imaging research on the neurobiological roots of criminal 
violence’ within offenders’ brains.”71  This approach is consistent with the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s standard in death penalty cases that the sentence reflect 
the “uniqueness of the individual” and “a reasoned moral response to the 
defendant’s background, character, and crime.”72 
There are also a number of ways neuroscience evidence can reduce judges’ 
implicit bias.73  Examples include neurological testing of a defendant’s 
thought processes so a judge can better understand what may have led to that 
defendant’s behavior.74  In addition, “individuation” requires judges of 
behavior to obtain sufficient information about the person they are assessing 
so that they can know that individual’s personal attributes.75 
Donald and Bakies conclude by emphasizing that the individuals who gain 
the most advantages from neuroscience developments in the criminal justice 
system are those who have traumatic childhoods before they get involved in 
crime.76  Individualized assessments can explain, in part, these defendants’ 
behaviors, especially if they experienced repeated traumatic situations, 
residence in a dangerous inner-city neighborhood, or a life growing up in 
foster care or the welfare system.77   As the authors explain, “neuroscience 
offer[s] judges insight into individuals such as these, [and] it can also 
facilitate judges’ attempts to counteract implicit biases.”78 
Donald and Bakies’s focus on empathy and implicit bias is a fitting segue 
to an article on cautionary tales on empathy by Sheri Lynn Johnson, Amelia 
Courtney Hritz, Caisa Elizabeth Royer, and John H. Blume.79  The authors 
 
 67. Id. at 493. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 494. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 497 (quoting O. Carter Sneed, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital 
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1269 (2007)). 
 72. Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 73. Id. at 499. 
 74. Id. at 500. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 502. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., When Empathy Bites Back:  Cautionary Tales from 
Neuroscience for Capital Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 573 (2016). 
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explain how biases and stereotypes, specifically about race, can affect a 
judge’s or juror’s decision making.80  Likewise, the article introduces a new 
way that neuroscience can be used within the sentencing context by revealing 
how empathy helps explain how jurors’ identity affects decision making.81 
Capital sentencing trials, the authors note, present an inherent conflict:  
while prosecutors try to dehumanize defendants before a jury, defense 
attorneys try to humanize them.82  One of the primary vehicles for 
humanizing a defendant is mitigating evidence, which the Supreme Court has 
defined “broadly.”83  Nonetheless, “[s]uch evidence, and the empathy for the 
defendant it is intended to create, is perceived as central to persuading jurors 
to spare a capital defendant’s life.”84 
The concept of empathy, while heavily researched, is still somewhat of a 
mystery “and its implications for capital trials are largely unexplored.”85  
This is due, in part, to the concept’s differing definitions across studies.86  
That said, recent developments in neuroscience have enabled researchers to 
investigate various “components” of empathy,87 which the authors define “as 
the act of understanding and adopting another’s perspective, either through 
affective or cognitive processes.”88 
Individuals differ in their ability to empathize.  In general, females are 
more empathic than males.89  Older individuals (adults aged sixty to eighty) 
show higher empathy measures than all other age groups on some tests, but 
such results can differ depending on the kind of test being used.90  Individual 
differences in the ability to empathize also may predict behavior, thus 
showing that an underlying cognitive component of empathy is influenced 
by an individual’s attention and motivation.91  Individuals are more empathic 
toward those who bear a greater resemblance to them in terms of race, age, 
gender, et cetera (their “in-group”), than toward those of differing 
characteristics (their “out-group”).92  They also are more apt to dehumanize 
and stereotype those they perceive to be in an out-group.93  According to the 
authors, courtroom strategies may attempt to fuel the use of stereotypes, 
especially racial stereotypes, in an effort to dehumanize the defendant.94 
Researchers induce empathy to convey an emotional state in a range of 
ways—through facial expressions, bodily movements, mental processes,95 or 
 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. at 574. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 574–75. 
 85. Id. at 575. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 576. 
 88. Id. at 577–78. 
 89. Id. at 580. 
 90. Id. at 582. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 583. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 588. 
 95. Id. at 590. 
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simply asking a subject to “imagine him- or herself in the other’s place.”96  
Yet, the application of this research in the context of capital trials has had 
mixed results.  As the authors note, in terms of jury selection, “the 
neuroscience of empathy is very helpful in explaining how the identity of the 
jurors affects decision making, but it is not so helpful in figuring out how to 
eliminate the effects of individual differences.”97  Therefore, neuroscience 
research “reinforces the importance of vigilant judicial enforcement of 
prohibitions against discrimination in jury selection.”98 
These findings accentuate a number of problematic practices in death 
penalty litigation.  First, a detailed voir dire may reveal which jurors are most 
empathic; yet courts that have prohibited attorneys from questioning jurors 
about their views on particular types of mitigation “thwart the purpose of 
individualized sentencing” as well as attorneys’ efforts to select the most 
appropriately empathic jurors.99  Research has shown that specificity is 
important in this context because “it is more likely to evoke the automatic 
affective response.”100  Second, the prosecutor’s presentation of aggravating 
evidence that is not relevant specifically to the defendant’s crime may 
enhance the probability that the jury will engage in arbitrary decision 
making.101  Likewise, the kind of victim-impact statements approved of in 
Payne v. Tennessee102 are inappropriate because they potentially encourage 
“empathy-induced aggression, for which there is no constitutional 
justification.”103  Thus, both mitigating and aggravating evidence should be 
specific to the defendant’s case.104 
Overall, the authors conclude that the “neuroscience of empathy” reveals 
the extent to which decisions to sentence individuals to death are inevitably 
arbitrary and influenced by either “race or caprice.”105  Efforts can be made 
to diminish the extent of this arbitrariness; yet “we cannot alter basic neural 
responses to the pain of others and therefore cannot rationalize (in either 
sense of the word) empathic responses.”106 
The article by Ruben Gur, along with his coauthors Oren Gur, Alon Gur, 
and Arona Gur, shifts the focus from a judicial and juror perspective on 
neuroscience to a medical and clinical perspective concerning the 
presentation of neuroscience evidence during the sentencing phase.107  The 
article emphasizes in particular Ruben Gur’s experience as an expert witness 
and the lessons he learned from offering expert testimony on neuroscience in 
 
 96. Id. at 591. 
 97. Id. at 592. 
 98. Id. at 593. 
 99. Id. at 594. 
 100. Id. at 597. 
 101. Id. at 596. 
 102. 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the 
admissibility of victim impact evidence at a capital sentencing hearing). 
 103. Johnson et al., supra note 79, at 596. 
 104. Id. at 595–97. 
 105. Id. at 598. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Ruben C. Gur et al., A Perspective on the Potential Role of Neuroscience in the Court, 
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 547 (2016). 
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legal cases.108  Gur describes the process he employs to create medical and 
scientific reports intended to be used on defendants’ behalf during trials.109  
He also discusses how the evidence is treated in the courtroom—specifically, 
when and how it is presented, by whom, and for what purpose,110 and what 
happens if this evidence is not presented. 
Gur and his coauthors begin with a brief history of the association between 
the human brain and behavior, the development of phrenology, and a 
discussion of early groundbreaking research that contributed to the discovery 
that brain lesions can influence different kinds of behaviors according to the 
type and location of the damage.111  At the start of the twenty-first century, 
neuroscience testimony in courts began to emerge full force in important 
Supreme Court decisions, including Atkins v. Virginia112 and Roper v. 
Simmons.113  In sync with these decisions, Gur has offered testimony 
concerning how certain types of brain damage have the potential to affect 
human behavior.114  As the authors explain, while the legal system has long 
considered the effects of brain damage on behavior, only recently has a 
“rigorously tested brain behavior science” become “increasingly 
available.”115  Predictably, some scientists oppose the use of such 
neuroscience evidence in court because they feel it is flawed or more 
influential than probative;116 yet perhaps the greater impediment for 
neuroscientist expert witnesses is that “while more precise and reliable, data 
will become increasingly more difficult to understand and, therefore, 
explain.”117 
Gur’s initial involvement in medical-legal consultation started with his 
research in the 1970s using neuroimaging technology to understand behavior 
and then his development of the largest normative positron emission 
tomography (PET) database at that time.118  This database became the 
foundation for Gur’s testimony during a death penalty trial,119 after which he 
began receiving referrals primarily from defense attorneys in capital cases 
but also from prosecutors in criminal and civil cases involving questions 
about the effects of brain damage.120 
The authors describe, in detail, the standards that Gur and his team use to 
examine the link between behavior and brain function, as well as the 
 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. at 559–65. 
 110. Id. at 565–69. 
 111. Id. at 549–52. 
 112. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of 
the death penalty on individuals with intellectual disabilities). 
 113. 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see id. at 578 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
“imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes 
were committed”). 
 114. Gur et al., supra note 107, at 557. 
 115. Id. at 548. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.at 557. 
 119. Id. at 558. 
 120. Id. 
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procedures he and interested lawyers follow to determine if Gur will get 
involved in a case.121  Gur and his coauthors conclude with a summary of the 
lessons that he and his team have learned over the years about testifying about 
neuroscience results.122  For example, while “courts and experts may vary in 
their knowledge and understanding of neuroscience methodology,”123 it also 
bears emphasizing that “inappropriate dismissal of or failure to introduce 
neuroscience evidence pretrial [can produce a domino effect and have] long-
term adverse effects on subsequent litigation.”124 
Finally, the authors address a number of objections commentators have 
offered regarding neuroscience evidence in the courtroom.125  For example, 
in response to criticism that such testimony provides “an excuse for violence 
by deflecting responsibility from the person to a brain structure,” the authors 
emphasize that neuroscience evidence is only one of numerous possible 
mitigating factors in a case.126  Regardless of these and other objections, the 
authors predict that the role of neuroscience in the legal system will continue 
to expand.127 
Gur and his coauthors’ forecast concerning the expanding role of 
neuroscience is aptly illustrated by Joel Zivot’s examination of the 
quandaries that arise when a defendant with a preexisting medical condition 
is sentenced to death by lethal injection.  This situation thereby creates an 
Eighth Amendment issue that reveals a deficiency in our sentencing 
procedures.128  In this context, neuroscience research can help to develop a 
more informed sentencing system, an approach also advocated by Gertner, 
Donald, and Bakies. 
Zivot introduces his article with the case of Ernest Johnson, a Missouri 
inmate sentenced to death by lethal injection for killing three employees 
during a convenience store robbery.129  Johnson, a victim of sexual abuse, 
also suffered from a number of other disorders, including an intellectual 
disability, fetal alcohol syndrome, traumatic head injury, and a brain tumor 
which was only partially removed.130  Zivot’s article concerns the legal and 
ethical implications of using lethal injection drugs on Johnson given that the 
drugs could cause Johnson to suffer a painful seizure due to his vulnerable 
medical condition.131 
In the context of this case, Zivot discusses capital punishment generally 
and the concept of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
 
 121. Id. at 559–65. 
 122. Id. at 565–69. 
 123. Id. at 565. 
 124. Id. at 568. 
 125. Id. at 569–71. 
 126. Id. at 569. 
 127. Id. at 571. 
 128. See Joel Zivot, Too Sick to Be Executed:  Shocking Punishment and the Brain, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (2016). 
 129. Id. at 697. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 701. 
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Amendment with respect to execution methods.132  Lethal injection, now the 
most pervasive method of execution in the United States, is “never a medical 
act” according to Zivot; yet it “co-opts the tools of the medical trade” and 
therefore stirs controversy.133 
Estelle v. Gamble134 held that indifference to prisoner health constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment and therefore violates the Eighth 
Amendment.135  Estelle has been interpreted as upholding a prisoner’s right 
to health care, which a warden has a legal duty to provide.136  This obligation 
leads to Zivot’s core question:  If an inmate dies as a result of a state-
sanctioned execution, when, if ever, is it appropriate during the execution for 
the legal system to set aside the inmate’s healthcare?  As Zivot contends, 
“[c]apital punishment cannot be brought about as a consequence of 
withholding necessary healthcare.  Nor can it occur by the infliction of 
sublethal injuries that, in the course of time, are expected to worsen and cause 
death.”137  Likewise, the state would be obligated to resuscitate any inmate 
who survives an execution attempt.138 
Missouri death-row inmate Russell Bucklew has serious health issues that 
could impede the state’s efforts to execute him by lethal injection.139  
Bucklew’s attorneys asked Zivot to examine Bucklew and give his opinion 
on Bucklew’s Eighth Amendment stay application concerning the effects of 
the lethal injection procedure on Bucklew’s condition.140  According to 
Zivot, Bucklew “had a substantial risk of ‘suffering grave adverse events 
during the execution, including hemorrhaging, suffocating, and experiencing 
excruciating pain.’”141  Justice Alito granted Bucklew’s stay of execution and 
Bucklew remains on death row.142 
Where do these dilemmas leave Ernest Johnson, another physically 
impaired death row inmate?  Johnson experiences seizures that seemingly 
stem from prior brain trauma and his parafalcine meningioma resection.143  
The drugs used during the lethal injection process are barbiturates, which 
have the potential to trigger seizures in someone with Johnson’s condition.144  
According to Zivot, Johnson’s “medical condition would lead to a seizure at 
the time of his execution, resulting in cruel punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.”145  In part as a result of Zivot’s testimony, the Supreme 
Court eventually issued Johnson a temporary stay of execution.146 
 
 132. Id. at 698. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 135. Id. at 104. 
 136. Zivot, supra note 128, at 698. 
 137. Id. at 699 (footnote omitted). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 700. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. (quoting Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1126 (8th Cir. 2015)). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 701. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 702. 
 146. Id. 
2016] FOREWORD:  CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND THE BRAIN 411 
Johnson’s medical condition presents a dilemma for both the courts and 
the medical system.  “Lethal injection is not a medical act but approximates 
it to a sufficient degree that it compels the involvement of doctors.  If a doctor 
comments or advises on aspects of execution, he or she risks being sanctioned 
or reprimanded by professional medical societies.”147  At the same time, if 
states continue to use lethal injection, they will remain plagued by 
uncomfortable medical questions.  On this matter, Zivot’s stance is clear:  
“Between the interests of the state and the interests of the medical profession, 
lethal injection does not offer an ethical, halfway compromise.”148 
The articles by Zivot and Gur and his coauthors focus on the substance of 
their own expert testimony as well as the parameters of mitigating evidence 
and the context in which it is used.  Deborah Denno’s article continues the 
discussion further and concludes the section on sentencing by providing a 
detailed description of how and when prosecutors and defense attorneys 
present neuroscience evidence and for what purpose.149  Denno’s article takes 
an evidence-based and multidisciplinary approach to examining how courts 
respond to neuroscience evidence in capital cases when the defense presents 
it to argue that the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime was below 
the given legal requisite due to some neurologic or cognitive deficiency.150  
The article relies on data from Denno’s Neuroscience Study (“the Study”) to 
explore capital cases where the defendant argued for a lower level of mens 
rea.151  The Study consists of all criminal law cases (totaling 800) that 
addressed neuroscience evidence from January 1, 1992, to December 31, 
2012.152  Attorneys can introduce neuroscience evidence either during the 
guilt-or-innocence phase, the penalty phase, or both. 
In a capital case, “prevailing professional norms” mandate that attorneys 
conduct a “thorough investigation” of “all reasonably available mitigating 
evidence” pertaining to a defendant’s relevant background and cognitive or 
intellectual deficiencies.153  Courts not only expect attorneys to investigate 
and use available neuroscience evidence when appropriate but also penalize 
them for neglecting to do so.  The Study shows that “courts regularly accept 
neuroscience evidence to mitigate punishments”154 and that such evidence is 
introduced into court nearly exclusively by defense attorneys as a vehicle to 
eliminate or mitigate their clients’ punishments, especially in death penalty 
cases.155 
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Neuroscience evidence, however, is rarely employed by prosecutors in 
rebuttal to argue future dangerousness.156  Of the Study’s 553 cases, only 10 
cases (all capital murder) involved successful uses by prosecutors of such 
evidence.157  Yet, Denno has shown that prosecutors do introduce such 
evidence on their own (not in rebuttal).158  When they do, such evidence 
nearly always involves the victim rather than the defendant, and it is nearly 
exclusively brain scan evidence.159  In addition, one-half of these cases relied 
on shaken baby syndrome evidence where the neuroscience diagnosis often 
“successfully serves as the sole foundation for a prosecutor’s case; there is 
commonly no proof of the defendant’s act or intent, except for the victim’s 
brain scan and the accompanying medical expert testimony, because so little 
circumstantial evidence is available.”160  This finding not only shows a 
prosecutorial use of neuroscience evidence, but a troubling misuse of such 
evidence.161 
Denno examines further the differences between prosecutors and defense 
attorneys in her analysis of thirty-nine capital cases in which neuroscience 
evidence was introduced to argue that defendants did not have the requisite 
mens rea to commit the crimes for which they were convicted.162  While most 
of these cases involved claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, defense 
counsel successfully used neuroscience evidence in nearly one quarter of 
them.163 
However, Denno contends that while courts seem to rely on a wide range 
of neuroscience evidence for their determinations in these cases, they lack 
sufficient guidance even under the framework of Strickland v. 
Washington.164  Instead, the primary guidepost for many of these cases 
depends, either explicitly or implicitly, on “double-edged sword” arguments, 
which support the view that neuroscience evidence can either be helpful or 
hurtful to a defendant depending on how it is being argued.165  According to 
Denno, the courts’ emphasis on a double-edged-sword analysis is inadequate 
and speculative because courts commonly accept defense counsel’s 
justifications for omitting neuroscience evidence when in fact it could well 
have helped the defendant in terms of mitigation.166  Courts’ responses also 
do not consider the additional kinds of evidentiary complexities involved in 
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lesser mens rea decisions assessing neuroscience, most particularly the role 
of context in distinguishing between aggravating and mitigating evidence.167 
Courts’ differing perspectives on what constitutes mitigating or 
aggravating evidence therefore suggest that the “double-edged sword” 
framework is simplistic and, at times, misleading.168  Denno sides with the 
court in Smith v. Dretke,169 which proposes a “reasonable jurist[]” standard 
as well as reliance on professional norms to assess an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim based on neuroscience.170 
The article concludes that courts could more effectively apply 
neuroscience evidence in intent determinations if they go beyond the double-
edged sword approach and establish a more realistic framework in terms of 
the “reasonable jurist[].”171  Neuroscience evidence and better guideposts, 
then, can help address questions about a defendant’s level of intent, which lie 
at the heart of the criminal law and its system of punishment.172 
III.  EXPANDING THE USES OF NEUROSCIENCE 
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Many scholars see a potential for neuroscience to create positive future 
changes within the realm of the criminal law.  For instance, neuroscience may 
help predict antisocial or violent behavior, advance reform in our correctional 
system, provide greater understanding of criminal mens rea and moral 
blameworthiness, and prove beneficial to areas of criminal law beyond 
mitigation during sentencing.  The articles in this part each discuss one or 
more ways in which neuroscience can further aid the justice system. 
The article by Jane Campbell Moriarty argues that advances in 
neuroscience can assist in a greater understanding of criminal mens rea and 
moral blameworthiness, which also would bolster the determination of lesser 
mens rea arguments along the lines discussed by Denno.173  In addition, 
Moriarty believes that neuroscience can improve the approach and use of 
other defenses, particularly insanity.174 
Moriarty begins her article with the story of an extremely difficult and 
taxing patient in a psychiatric hospital.175  After one of the hospital’s doctors 
ordered a CT scan, which revealed damage to the patient’s prefrontal cortex, 
the nurses tended to blame the patient less for her outbursts.176  As Moriarty 
explains, “This state of mind and emotion, where we shift from blaming a 
person for behavior to potentially excusing her, is where the historical origins 
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of the insanity defense reside within us.”177  Neuroimaging test results that 
are both accurate and relevant to legal insanity may encourage “more 
rationally premised decision making.”178  Yet, they also reveal complex and 
controversial questions179 and considerations of whether, for example, 
human behavior should “be reduced to brain states.”180 
In general, Moriarty suggests that such images might provide a more 
realistic understanding of both mental illness and the effects of traumatic 
brain injury in the future, as well as better clarify the relationship between 
cognition and behaviors.181  Moriarty’s article, however, “focuses only on 
the conception of legal insanity in light of developing neuroscience” rather 
than courtroom evidence.182  She suggests that neuroscience might advance 
the conception of legal insanity in three ways:  (1) by establishing current 
medical perspectives of legal insanity according to a “brain science that 
complements and possibly refines” observationally based diagnoses, (2) by 
better informing and integrating the association “between disordered 
thinking and aberrant behavior,” and (3) by illuminating “our moral sense of 
blameworthiness.”183 
The insanity defense has been heavily criticized for a range of reasons:  it 
is rarely used or successful and it exists in a “state of chaos” in part because 
of restrictive legislation, public disfavor, and a political proclivity to 
incarcerate the mentally ill.184  At the same time, research conducted in 
neuroscience and other scientific disciplines appears superior in the 
“understanding, prediction, diagnosis, and treatment of mental illnesses, such 
as schizophrenia.”185  As Moriarty explains, “It is thus an appropriate time, 
perhaps, to consider developing neuroscience research and whether it could 
inform a reconstruction of legal insanity going forward.”186  Such a 
recommendation is particularly timely given Moriarty’s discussion of the 
history and current state of the insanity defense and her conclusion that 
“whether the insanity defense—in any form—is a constitutionally protected 
right is unclear and far from certain.”187  Regardless, a general consensus 
remains that the insanity defense serves a vital “jurisprudential role” for 
particular individuals.188 
In an effort to hone her points, Moriarty provides an overview of various 
imaging techniques (x-ray, CT, MRI, fMRI, PET) and selects schizophrenia 
as a point of focus.189  She also discusses the frequency of traumatic brain 
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injury in the United States190 and what current research and commentary 
reveal about the relationship between brain trauma and behavioral control.191  
Such an overview fuels her agreement with those who believe there should 
be a volitional prong to the insanity defense and that neuroscience may “more 
accurately explain the relationship among brain lesions (or illness), 
cognition, impulsivity, and behavioral control.”192 
Neuroscience can enhance the role of blameworthiness in the criminal law 
by offering a stronger and more scientific foundation for diagnoses.  
“[N]euroscience may also encourage the judicial system to reject the 
stereotypes and myths that have shaped our current insanity defense doctrines 
and embrace a more humane way of dealing with the mentally ill and brain-
injured criminal defendants.”193  Indeed, research evaluating the impact of 
neuroscience explanations on defenses pertaining to mens rea and insanity 
should highlight the potential for neuroscience to help guide real decision 
making regarding insanity determinations.  As Moriarty concludes, “The 
research on the effects of neuroscientific explanations for the mens rea 
defense and the insanity defense demonstrate the positive potential of 
neuroscience to improve decision making in response to such defenses.”194 
Similar to Moriarty’s article, the article by Elizabeth S. Scott, Richard J. 
Bonnie, and Laurence Steinberg discusses important changes in policy that 
have been prompted by neuroscience evidence, specifically juvenile 
culpability and developmental brain research.195  The article examines what 
these neuroscience studies suggest in relation to the culpability of young 
adults, contending that there should be a transitional category for young 
adults that is distinct from juveniles and adults.196  This transitional category 
would allow for more effective sentencing and rehabilitation opportunities 
for this group.197 
The past decade’s focus on the link between developmental brain research 
and crime regulation, especially as it relates to juvenile culpability, has been 
associated with a growing rejection by legislatures and courts of a punitive 
approach to young offenders.198  As the authors note, four Supreme Court 
opinions have dismissed severe adult sentences for juveniles in light of two 
empirically based principles:  First, because of their cognitive immaturity, 
juvenile offenders are generally less culpable and therefore merit less 
punishment than adults.  Second, because their immaturity is the source of 
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their criminality, more juveniles are capable of reforming their behavior 
relative to adults.199 
Indeed, the past decade’s research also has shown that individuals continue 
to mature and develop up to their early twenties, therefore prompting the 
question of whether young adult offenders should benefit from the 
presumptions of lesser culpability and greater reform potential that are 
applied to juveniles.200  Such an approach “would represent a substantial 
departure from what has become a commonly recognized boundary in the 
justice system between juveniles and adults”—age eighteen.201 
Scientific research does not show, however, that youths between eighteen 
and twenty-one appear “indistinguishable from younger adolescents in 
attributes relevant to criminal offending and punishment.”202  Therefore, the 
authors question, “on both scientific and pragmatic grounds,” proposals 
suggesting that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction raise its cap to age twenty-
one.203  That said, there are firm reasons to support some correctional reform, 
as young adult offenders can still lead societally productive lives if they are 
given the opportunity while they are still developing.204 
The authors’ suggestions for reform presume that young adults constitute 
a separate category of offenders and therefore merit special sentencing and 
parole policies as well as correctional programs geared toward taking on 
adult roles.205  In addition, they believe that juvenile correctional and 
rehabilitative programs can be tailored for young adults so that they can 
receive educational and vocational skill training and other policies directed 
toward reducing recidivism.206 
The authors reject other proposals for handling young adults.  For example, 
attempting “a unitary rehabilitative justice system with general jurisdiction 
over juveniles and young adults” is too bold a move.207  According to the 
authors, young adults will benefit more from institutional reforms in the adult 
system than from being relegated to a juvenile status, although juvenile court 
jurisdiction could perhaps be somewhat extended in certain circumstances.208  
Regardless, adjusting sentencing policies for young adults and contributing 
to programs that provide them criminality-free life skills “will serve social 
welfare, as well as the interests of the most vulnerable young adults.”209 
In addition to aiding in the understanding of moral culpability and 
differences in brain development between groups, neuroscience can also be 
used to help decipher and predict violence.  The article by Lyn M. Gaudet, 
Jason P. Kerkmans, Nathaniel E. Anderson, and Kent A. Kiehl focuses on 
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the prediction of antisocial behavior, contending that such efforts may help 
to reduce recidivism rates by providing a remedy for high-risk behavior 
through appropriate treatment.210 
In the article’s introduction, the authors ask the following question, which 
frames the core of their argument:  “If we can get information from 
neuroscience techniques, does that information add predictive utility to 
understanding and assessing antisocial behavior?”211  They conclude that 
current research would “suggest that it does.”212 
In an effort to investigate this question, the article begins with a review of 
the four categories of factors currently available to predict antisocial behavior 
or violence:  “dispositional, historical, clinical, and contextual.”213  After 
specifying the caveats and varying types of models that could weigh these 
factors, the article in turn discusses the different prediction models for 
determining future violence and how these models could accommodate 
incoming scientific advances.214  These models have a range:  (1) “clinical 
predictions,” the oldest type of prediction in forensic settings, which typically 
use psychiatrists and psychologists;215 (2) “actuarial predictions,” which are 
based on longitudinal data and statistics to assess risk and the likelihood that 
an individual belongs to a predicted group;216 and (3) “psychological and 
personality measures,” which rely on neuropsychological testing and 
assessment of psychopathic personality disorder,217 arguably “the single best 
predictor of criminal behavior and recidivism.”218 
The authors then examine legal precedent concerning the application of 
different prediction methods and the challenges to them, primarily through 
the use of recidivism rates.219  While some of the methods have been 
seriously challenged in court, the article notes that, in a series of three cases, 
the Supreme Court has upheld the use of psychiatric testimony for providing 
an expert opinion on a defendant’s future dangerousness.220  In light of the 
dubious nature of this testimony, the authors emphasize that the “addition of 
actuarial tools also could be what distinguishes an assessment of future 
dangerousness as sufficiently reliable to pass Daubert [v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.221] in comparison to a pure clinical assessment 
alone.”222  One powerful tool is an individual’s brain age, as opposed to their 
chronological age. 
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The article introduces recent neuroscience research and reviews two 
studies that were able to accurately incorporate neuroimaging techniques to 
predict recidivism.223  While criticisms are commonly levied against the 
various prediction methods, there are also disparities between the attitudes of 
the scientific versus legal communities toward risk assessment generally and 
neuroscience specifically.224  In addition, the actuarial methods are viable 
and ethical only if certain conditions are met:  researchers apply the 
appropriate techniques and tools,225 have sufficient training,226 and take into 
account potential equal protection implications so that offenders are not 
wrongly excluded from certain treatment programs that may be particularly 
beneficial to them.227 
Finally, the authors explain why neuroscience methods are likely to 
continue to help inform and, ideally, improve the tools embraced by the 
criminal justice system by way of assessing, understanding, and predicting 
human behavior.228  The two forensic neuroprediction studies that the article 
examines, for example, “provide a strong demonstration of how neuroscience 
measures can change the way we think about variables that we already 
recognize for their influence on behavior,” including recidivism rates.229  To 
remedy recidivism, the United States needs to implement workable measures 
that incorporate an understanding of brain structure and function, particularly 
in individuals who have been violent or are at high risk for future violence.230 
The authors’ belief that neuroscience can serve to improve the justice 
system’s approach to treatment is one that is also held by Arielle R. Baskin-
Sommers and Karelle Fonteneau.231  However, Baskin-Sommers and 
Fonteneau contend that the courtroom is not the correct setting within the 
justice system for the use of neuroscience.232  Instead, neuroscience should 
be implemented to reform current policies related to the use of segregation, 
the physical surroundings and makeup of the correctional environment, and 
inmate treatments.233  Neuroscience can better help criminal defendants in 
this way than in the trial or sentencing phases.234 
The application of neuroscience in the criminal justice system has recently 
taken center stage to help diagnose conditions that may mitigate an inmate’s 
responsibility as well as pinpoint those factors that may influence decision 
makers in sentencing.235  While some studies have revealed possible neural 
correlates of criminal conduct, “there is no discipline-wide consensus on 
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those correlates” or their associations to certain types of criminality.236  
Rather, neuroscience tests are based on probability assessments:  techniques 
such as EEGs and brain scans “cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that 
distinct brain structures or abnormalities” impact an individual’s mental state 
at the time of the crime or whether that individual will commit future 
crimes.237  In addition, neuroscience tests are extremely expensive and 
financially inaccessible to many criminal defendants, thereby infusing the 
criminal justice system with even more economic disparities among 
defendants.238 
The authors contend that findings from neuroscience can instead be 
applied to enhance correctional settings so that “[s]uch applications bypass 
the constraints and requirements of both science and the law without 
worsening the disparities that currently exist in the criminal justice 
process.”239  For example, solitary confinement, or segregation, pertains to 
an individual’s isolation in a prison cell for twenty-two to twenty-four hours 
a day.240  Such conditions are severely detrimental to an inmate’s mental and 
physical health, and they can cause “persistent emotional trauma and 
distress,” as well as hypersensitivity to the environment, hallucinations, 
anxiety, depression, and more.241  There have been only a limited number of 
human studies on the “underlying mechanisms that produce such 
psychopathology.”242  Yet a substantial amount of research on nonhuman 
animals has discovered evidence of chemical imbalances in the brain and 
cognitive impairment resulting from segregation.243  Some human studies on 
individuals raised in institutional settings have demonstrated similar 
patterns.244  Thus, neuroscience research points to the abolition of 
segregation because of its harmful effects.245 
The overall physical surroundings and makeup of general population 
settings also negatively influence human behavior and brain functioning.  As 
the authors note, “Neuroscience can be particularly useful in understanding 
the mechanisms that produce such adverse consequences as well as suggest 
policies and practices that avoid or counteract these effects.”246  Indeed, 
neuroscience research has revealed three factors that are especially damaging 
to the brains and behaviors of incarcerated individuals:  overcrowding, noise, 
and toxins.247  These findings are particularly relevant for correctional 
facilities, which suffer from overcrowding, noise pollution, and toxin 
exposure resulting from inadequate sewage and waste disposal, poor water 
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quality, and other problems.248  But such factors also “have the potential to 
negatively impact neural regions responsible for emotion, cognition, and 
behavioral control,” as well as the capacity to “worsen already problematic 
neural and behavioral tendencies.”249 
The authors conclude by calling for a reconceptualization of how 
neuroscience is used within the criminal justice system.250  If implemented 
appropriately, the kinds of neuroscience findings that the authors discuss “all 
have the tremendous potential to affect meaningful—and much needed—
correctional change in the United States today.”251 
Erin Murphy’s article bridges the gap between the argument that 
neuroscience can be used to improve the sentencing process and Baskin-
Sommers and Fonteneau’s argument that neuroscience instead can be used to 
improve correctional facilities and treatment.252  Murphy claims that 
neuroscience has the ability to be employed in new settings, such as bail 
hearings, competency determinations, and noncapital sentencing.253  If 
applied successfully in these ways, neuroscience also may prove more 
relevant in civil adjudications as well.  Given that neuroscience is constantly 
growing and evolving, Murphy’s approach is practical in its belief that the 
neuroscience applications will continue to expand to more settings within the 
judicial system. 
Murphy’s article explores the future admissibility of “novel neuroscience 
evidence” in both civil and criminal cases.254  Murphy’s use of the phrase 
“novel neuroscience” is meant to “exclude relatively noncontroversial uses 
of neuroscience” or the “fairly noncontroversial consequence” as well as 
“assessments that have only remote connection to the physical condition of 
the brain.”255 
As a foundation for her article, Murphy introduces some background to the 
Daubert rulings and highlights issues regarding the decision’s applicability 
to civil versus criminal cases.256  In essence, there appears to be “a Daubert 
double-standard.”257  Murphy points out that in civil cases, courts discuss 
“both science and statistics with plenty of acumen,” but in criminal cases, 
“courts are unable to muster the most minimal grasp of why a standardless 
form of comparison might lack evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness.”258 
Such a distinction between the civil and criminal contexts is difficult to 
decipher because the two fields often rely on different disciplines for their 
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evidence.259  But even when civil and criminal cases both share the same kind 
of evidence, courts are more willing to admit evidence for the prosecution 
than for plaintiffs in civil cases.260  This outcome supports Murphy’s 
“underlying premise:  it depends as much on the offering party as it does on 
the type of case.”261 
Murphy contends that novel neuroscience presents a different kind of 
framework because it can provide relevant evidence to all parties involved in 
a case.262  In civil cases, novel neuroscientific evidence is generally offered 
by plaintiffs to demonstrate a brain injury, support a finding of toxic 
encephalopathy, or engage in lie detection.263  In criminal cases, however, 
novel neuroscientific evidence is most commonly introduced by the 
defendant in death penalty cases for the purpose of mitigation.264  Yet, so far, 
courts have been inconsistent in their attitude toward novel neuroscience 
even for these purposes.265 
While the future of neuroscientific admissibility is unknown, Murphy tells 
us to presume two possibilities:  (1) claimants, seemingly undaunted, will 
persist in proffering such evidence, and courts will keep facing challenges 
concerning scientific validity and (2) the science will become ever more valid 
and reliable.266  Yet Murphy emphasizes “one significant exception” to the 
tendency of courts to resist novel neuroscience evidence:  when defendants 
in sentencing proceedings offer it.267  She predicts that such an exception 
may encourage prosecutors to use novel neuroscience evidence more 
frequently and that it may lead to the use of such evidence in the guilt and 
pretrial phases as well.268 
There is a third possibility that Murphy considers:  “[T]he current trend 
holds even as prosecutors seek to marshal neuroscientific evidence in support 
of their claims.  Courts would extend the general skepticism shown to 
plaintiffs who offer novel techniques to prosecutors, even while continuing 
to carve out a role for the criminal defendant.”269 
Novel neuroscience, therefore, presents a point of conflict.  Nonetheless, 
Murphy believes that it is capable of gaining traction in civil cases as well.270  
The evidence will start to become more familiar to judges and the 
“novelty . . . may start to wear off.”271  Judges may also develop a greater 
sense of the disparities involved with its use—“the notion that neuroscience 
is somehow reliable enough for a death sentence determination but not for 
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less serious offenses or monetary claims.”272  In addition, judges may start to 
consider “such evidence reliable when it confirms other proof, or even their 
own intrinsic beliefs about a particular condition, and incline toward a more 
generous Daubert or Frye [v. United States273] standard in noncapital or civil 
cases.”274 
CONCLUSION 
This Foreword’s discussion of articles on neuroscience and the law 
represents a range of experts who participated in the Fordham Law Review’s 
symposium, Criminal Behavior and the Brain:  When Law and Neuroscience 
Collide (cosponsored by the Fordham Law School Neuroscience and Law 
Center).  The symposium provided a comprehensive forum on the legal, 
scientific, and ethical issues that concern the human brain and behavior.  May 
this forum inspire other scholarly gatherings on this rapidly evolving topic. 
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